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INTRODUCTION
It is 4pm on a hot summer Saturday in Henderson, Nevada. Phil, an avid
St. Louis Cardinals fan, settles down in front of his TV, ready to watch the
game. He bought an “all-access” subscription from his cable provider, and paid
more than $100 to ensure that he would be able to watch his beloved Cardinals.
Phil scrolls through the guide, passing hundreds of other channels, until he
reaches the large block of channels that read “Major League Baseball.” Imagine
Phil’s surprise, and confusion, when he can’t find the Cardinals game.1 He
double-checks their schedule, and indeed, the first pitch was to be thrown at
4:05 p.m. PST. So why can’t Phil find the Cardinals game? Unfortunately for
Phil, on this particular Saturday, the St. Louis Cardinals are playing the Los
Angeles Dodgers. This means that Phil, despite his “all-access” subscription,
will not be able to watch the Cardinals games this weekend.
What Phil—like hundreds of other consumers in Nevada—didn’t realize, is
that his “all-access” subscription only allows him to watch some of the baseball
games that are scheduled for broadcast. What Phil didn’t realize is that his living in Nevada has prevented him from watching certain teams’ games. Phil had
no idea that he needed to have access to content provided to broadcasters by
numerous regional sports networks to view all of the baseball games he expected to be included in his subscription. Instead of watching the Cardinals
game as he had hoped, Phil will instead experience what many baseball fans
have experienced: a sports broadcast “blackout.”
Understandably, Phil may have assumed that all baseball games would be
part of an “all-access” game subscription. What Phil did not realize was that
Major League Baseball (MLB) teams retain exclusive broadcast rights within
their home team territories, allowing them to control how consumers access
broadcasts within that region. Nevada consumers like Phil may have assumed
that all baseball games are “out-of-market” for Nevadans, or that they are not
“home team” games. After all, Nevada is not the home to any MLB team.
However, this assumption—although logical—is vastly different from the reality. If we are to refer to “in-market” teams as our “home teams” for the purposes
of telecasting rights, then Major League Baseball has determined that Southern
1

Consumers like Phil may also experience a “blackout” by selecting the game, only to be
greeted with the MLB’s “blackout message.” Blackouts FAQ, MLB.COM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/help/faq_blackout.jsp [https://perma.cc/5GA8-RLYU] (last visited
Apr. 7, 2016).
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Nevada has six home teams: the Oakland Athletics, the San Francisco Giants,
the San Diego Padres, the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, the Arizona Diamondbacks, and the Los Angeles Dodgers.2 By contrast, Northern Nevada has
only two home teams: the Oakland Athletics and the San Francisco Giants.
Similar to Southern Nevada, however, neither of these teams have any apparent, demonstrated relation to Nevada.3
This article will explore the impact that the high number of in-market
games has on Nevadan consumers, and will primarily focus on Southern Nevada. Part I of this article will provide a curtailed overview on antitrust law. Part
II will give a brief background and overview of the MLB telecasting rights,4
and will also discuss who determines whether a team is in- or out-of-market.
Part III of this article will discuss the long-standing “MLB Exemption,” which
has kept the MLB outside of the reach of federal antitrust laws since 1922. Part
III will also address recent legal challenges brought against the MLB and its
antitrust exemption, and will address the analysis courts use when hearing these
challenges. Part IV will look more specifically at Southern Nevada and will analyze whether the MLB’s conduct invokes provisions of both Federal and Nevada law by designating Southern Nevada as “home” to six baseball teams. Part
IV will also look at the potential impact that the in- and out-of-market distinction has on Las Vegas consumers, and the recourse (or lack thereof) available
to consumers who experience the blackout. Finally, this article will conclude by
offering some suggestions for ways to limit or mitigate the burden that the
MLB “Baseball Exemption” places on Nevadan consumers.5
I.

A BRIEF PRIMER ON ANTITRUST LAW: WHAT ARE ANTITRUST LAWS, AND
WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

If we were to oversimplify the scope and purpose of antitrust legislation,
we could say that antitrust laws are meant to prevent anticompetitive business
practices or unreasonable restrictions on competition that harm or undermine
the free market of capitalism.6 Although the antitrust laws contained in Title 15,
Chapter 1 of the United States Code are more nuanced than this brief descrip2

Blackout, MLB.COM, http://www.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/blackout.jsp?postalCode=%2
089120 [https://perma.cc/3VGA-5UCQ] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
3 Blackout, MLB.COM, http://www.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/blackout.jsp?postalCode=%2
089523 [https://perma.cc/NZ7D-7SL5] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
4 Though this article is titled “Major League Broadcasting” as a tongue-in-cheek reference
to its baseball content, the issue at hand is more properly referred to as “telecasting.” The
terms “broadcasting” and “telecasting” will largely be used interchangeably throughout, referring predominantly to commercial television rights as opposed to other means of electronic mass communication like internet or radio transferal.
5 In the interest of simplicity, this article will refer to this as the “Baseball Exemption,” but
capitalization of the term should not be construed as recognition of its applicability to any of
the proposed analyses contained herein.
6 See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Clayton Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 52–53 (2012); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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tion implies, the overarching purpose of the Chapter is to prevent unreasonable
restraints to trade.7 Antitrust laws benefit consumers and the market by prohibiting—and hopefully preventing—anticompetitive business practices, ultimately fostering an economy that encourages innovation, keeps service quality high,
and pushes prices down.8
Antitrust laws first originated in America in the 1890s, when Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act.9 The Sherman Act prohibits companies from
unreasonably restricting competition, and vests the Justice Department with authority to seek redress from federal courts for Sherman Act violations.10 The
Federal Trade Commission’s authority to take action against antitrust violators
offers American consumers further protection against anticompetitive practices.11 Indeed, by enacting the Sherman Act, “Congress ‘wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly
agreements. . . .’ ”12 Without the protections offered by the Sherman Act and its
progeny, corporations and conglomerates would have the capacity to consolidate power and fix product prices far above “fair market value.” In a society
based upon a free market economy, the consequences of inadequate antitrust
laws could be devastating.
II. MAJOR LEAGUE BROADCASTING RIGHTS
A.

“Home Television Territory” Organization for Major League
Baseball

The MLB imposes strict restrictions on television broadcasting rights of
live sporting events. The MLB’s Constitution includes many provisions broadcasting of different franchises and Clubs to the exception of others.13 Specifically, Article X, Section 3 of the MLB Constitution gives each Club exclusive
contract rights to the live telecast of its home and away games, so long as those
7

See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
See Anticompetitive Practices, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/enforce
ment/anticompetitive-practices [https://perma.cc/T3BU-DHFQ] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
10 Id. § 4.
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (giving the FTC authority to use its administrative powers to
enforce the Sherman Act); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Trading Stamp Co.,
405 U.S. 233 (1972) (stating that the FTC has authority to take action against a company’s
“unfair” business practices, even if those practices don’t truly violate the Antitrust laws).
12 Gulf Oil Corp. v Copp Paving Co., 419 US 186, 194 (1974) (quoting United States v. Se.
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944)).
13 MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art.
VIII, § 9, http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources
/SportsEntLaw_Institute/League%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2
005Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4S-EX5R] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). In the interest of
clarity and simplicity, due to the frequent use of the term “MLB” throughout this article, the
authors will refer to the Major League Constitution—the governing document for Major
League Baseball—as “the MLB Constitution.”
8
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agreements are limited to the area of the Club’s “home television territory”
(HTT).14 These exclusive rights apply to all regular-season home and away
games.15 Notable exceptions to the HTT limitations are post-season and championship games.16 Additional exceptions are games that ESPN elects to air itself, which are available to all consumers with access to an ESPN broadcast,
and without regard to a given HTT.17
Though the MLB’s limitation of broadcasting rights within HTTs is unambiguous, the actual boundaries of the territories remain unclear. Article VIII of
the MLB Constitution provides, in part, that “the definitions of the home television territories of the Major League Clubs shall be maintained in the Commissioner’s Office.”18 Consequently, the actual boundaries of a Club’s HTT are not
necessarily public knowledge.19 This is in contrast to a Club’s “operating territories,” which are clearly designated in the MLB Constitution, and are comparatively limited in geographic scope.20 With few deviations, a Club’s operating
territory is confined to the county where the team is located, and those counties
in the immediate vicinity.21
Although the MLB Constitution does not determine the official areas of the
HTT, and they are not otherwise publically available through the MLB, there
are several approximated territory maps online that purport to depict the territories’ likely configuration.22 These maps have been generated through a number
of investigative approaches, including through contacting broadcasters, Clubs,
and through zip code search results performed on MLB.com—the most common way for consumers to determine which HTT (or HTTs) they fall within. 23
To market its all-inclusive television and online-viewing packages, the MLB
website allows users to enter their zip code and find out which Club’s (or
Clubs’) live games are blacked out given the residence at which the consumer
will watch his or her game package.24 These resources, as of this writing, are

14

Id. art. X, § 3.
Id.
16 Id. § 4.
17 Id.
18 Id. art. VIII, § 9.
19 Numerous outlets have, however, created maps that indicate rough boundaries for the
broadcasting regions. See Nathaniel Grow, End the Blackouts, HARDBALL TIMES (Jan. 14,
2015), http://www.hardballtimes.com/end-the-blackouts [https://perma.cc/2FRN-AA35].
These territorial maps, as discussed hereafter, have provided consumers exposure to market
divisions that, pursuant to the MLB Constitution, would otherwise remain with the Commissioner’s Office. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 9. Consumer transparency will be discussed at greater length infra.
20 MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
21 Id.
22 See Grow, supra note 19.
23 See, e.g., id.
24 Blackout Restrictions, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/index.jsp#black
out [https://perma.cc/6UTB-GRT9] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
15
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the only way the average consumer can approximate the area of the HTT that
controls available broadcasts.
In addition to a glaring lack of transparency, another issue that arises when
considering these maps is that the HTT broadcasting rights often extend significantly further than a Club’s ordinary operating territory and, in some circumstances, present significant overlaps among clubs.25
B. Regional Sports Networks
Because each MLB Club retains exclusive rights to contract with television
networks, consumers within the boundaries of that HTT experience multiple
limitations upon their access to the Club’s games. Consumers can generally only watch a team’s live games if they have access to the network that has contracted to carry its games.26 Clubs have determined that the most profitable
manner to exercise these exclusive rights is to offer their live game telecasts
through the use of regional sports networks.27 The term “regional sports network” (RSN) generally refers to a content-specific television station that offers
live broadcasts of professional and college sports to a local or regional market.28 The San Francisco Giants, for example, utilize Comcast Sports Net
(CSN) Bay Area as their RSN; CSN governs the exclusive broadcasting rights
to all San Francisco Giants games within the HTT.29
After paying for the right to be the exclusive provider of a Club’s telecasts
within its HTT, the RSN then negotiates with various satellite and cable providers within that HTT.30 These negotiations determine a viewer’s actual access
to a Club’s games. Generally, if the RSN is unable to reach an agreement with
25

The most egregious of these overlaps appear to be in Iowa and Southern Nevada, both of
which are claimed as HTTs of six MLB teams. See Erik Malinowski, WTF MLB? Baseball
Strikes Out with Its Streaming Policies, ROLLINGSTONE (June 5, 2015),
http://www.rollingstone.com/sports/features/wtf-mlb-baseball-strikes-out-with-its-streamingpolicies-20150605 [https://perma.cc/3DAL-R3JE]. However, it is perhaps the U.S. Territory
of Guam that best highlights the ridiculousness of the MLB blackout policy. People in Guam
cannot watch Oakland A’s or San Francisco Giants games because they are in the Northern
California “home” territory, even though Guam is nearly 5800 miles away from the Bay Area. Id.
26 Blackout Restrictions, supra note 24.
27 See Maury Brown, Through July, MLB Telecasts on Regional Sports Networks Dominate
Prime Time TV, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/20
14/08/05/mlb-telecasts-on-regional-sports-networks-dominate-prime-time-television/#268c3
bf12c24 [https://perma.cc/P39P-PSYS] (discussing Major League Baseball’s success in using regional sports networks, author Maury Brown noted that “[e]ach regional sports network televises an average of 148 MLB game per season, most in prime time (7p–11p), when
the television audience is the greatest and advertisers are looking to get the best bang for
their buck.”).
28 See George Foster et al., Determinants of Regional Sport Network Television Ratings in
MLB, NBA, and NHL, 28 J. SPORT MGMT. 356, 357 (2014).
29 See Giants Talk, COMCAST SPORTSNET BAY AREA, http://www.csnbayarea.com/giants
[https://perma.cc/QC95-HJBW] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
30 See Foster supra note 28, at 358.
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a provider, consumers within the Club’s HTT will be unable to watch the live
game telecasts of that respective Club. As an added consequence of this blackout, consumers have limited apparent recourse beyond making additional purchases with a competing provider that carries that RSN. Further, it is not necessarily apparent to consumers who, exactly, is to blame for game blackouts.
This brings us back Phil, the St. Louis Cardinals’ fan, sitting on his couch
wondering why he couldn’t watch his team. Part of Phil’s hypothetical problem
was that his beloved Cardinals were playing the Los Angeles Dodgers. In 2014,
the Dodgers made their own television channel—SportsNet LA—and signed an
exclusive deal with Time Warner Cable (TWC), giving TWC the right to run
and distribute SportsNet LA.31 For fourteen months, TWC essentially held
Dodgers games hostage: TWC customers could watch Dodgers games on
SportsNet LA, but TWC would not lower the per-home price for other distributors.32 Because of the stalemate between TWC and other cable providers, more
than half of the Los Angeles market was precluded from watching Dodgers
games in 2014.33 Luckily for many Dodgers fans, this impasse came to an end
when Charter Communications began carrying SportsNet LA in mid-2015.34
However, Phil remains unlucky because he lives in Las Vegas, and SportsNet
LA continues to be unavailable to most Las Vegas consumers.
C. Major League Baseball Broadcasting in Nevada
Nevada is in an interesting situation when it comes to MLB Home Television Territories and the corresponding RSNs. Pursuant to the MLB Constitution, a Club could have significant control over areas of Nevada, provided that
those areas fell within that Club’s operating territory. Again, this territory
31

Mike Axisa, Dodgers Announce Deal with Time Warner, Launch of SportsNet LA, CBS
SPORTS (Jan. 28, 2013, 11:38 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/eye-onbaseball/21620862/dodgers-announce-deal-with-time-warner-launch-of-sportsnet-la
[https://perma.cc/XS6T-NCWR]; see TIME WARNER CABLE SPORTSNET LA, http://watch.spo
rtsnetla.com/?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sportsnetla.com%2F [https://perma.cc/5Y7BXLVE] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
32 Ed Sherman, As TV Battle Looms, Many Dodgers Fans Left in Dark, USA TODAY (Feb.
26, 2014, 11:20 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2014/02/25/dodgerssigned-a-mega-86-billion-pact-with-time-warner-cable/5819387
[https://perma.cc/KJJ9HQTQ] (“DirecTV, Verizon FiOS and AT&T U-Verse are among the carriers balking at
charging their subscribers $4.50-$5 month per month to carry SportsNet LA. ESPN, by
comparison, gets about $5.40 per home, TNT $1.20.”).
33 Id. (“Time Warner’s 2 million cable subscribers in Los Angeles will get their Dodger
baseball from the moment the channel launches. The remaining 55% of the market’s TV
households are at the mercy of the network and their cable or satellite provider reaching an
agreement.”).
34 Meg James, Charter to Carry Dodgers Channel, SportsNet LA, Beginning Tuesday, L.A.
TIMES (June 4, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/laet-ct-charter-to-carry-dodger-channel-june-9-20150604-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZN9SA8QA]. However, it is worth noting that Charter only began carrying SportsNet LA once it
decided to acquire TWC for approximately $57 billion; the other pay-TV operators still refuse to pay the fees necessary to carry SportsNet LA. Id.
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would generally be limited to the county where the Club is located, as well as
immediately surrounding counties. The reality, however, is that Nevada is not
home to any MLB Clubs. To be sure, no MLB Club has any physical home
team presence in Nevada whatsoever, nor any apparent direct connection to
Nevada consumers. Accordingly, no portion of Nevada falls within any Club’s
operating territory to the same extent that Southern California, for example, is
squarely within the Los Angeles Dodgers’ operating area.
However, the geographic limits placed on a Club’s operating territory does
not correlate with the boundaries of a Club’s HTT. For example, despite the
obvious fact that no MLB club has a physical presence in Nevada, Northern
Nevada falls within both Oakland’s and San Francisco’s HTT.35 Accordingly,
California Bay Area teams (the San Francisco Giants and Oakland Athletics)
have near complete control over the access to their games in a neighboring state
that has no MLB presence of its own.
The HTT situation in Southern Nevada is even more troubling. Las Vegas
and the surrounding area falls within a significant overlap of six different MLB
Clubs and their RSNs: The Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim (Fox Sports
West),36 the San Francisco Giants (CSN Bay Area),37 the Oakland Athletics
(CSN California),38 the Los Angeles Dodgers (SportsNet by Time Warner Cable Company),39 the San Diego Padres (Fox Sports San Diego),40 and the Arizona Diamondbacks (Fox Sports Arizona).41
The obvious question is why the boundaries of HTTs need to be exponentially greater than the boundaries of a Club’s operating territory. The MLB
Constitution offers no clear-cut answer, but the use of RSNs as the lynchpin in
distributing live-game telecasts indicates that the MLB and its Clubs treat Nevada consumers as leverage for negotiations. This is apparent from the fact that
the larger the boundary of a Club’s HTT, the more consumers the RSN can
claim to have control over when it negotiates with a cable or satellite provider.
In this context, control over an HTT equates to control over recipients of advertising, because sports fans are more likely to watch a game live than record it
for later viewing.42
35

Grow, supra note 19.
RSNs and Their Big League Rights, SPORTS BUS. J. 22 (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.sports
businessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2014/03/17/In-Depth/RSN-chart.aspx
[https://perma.cc/YQ86-KRB4].
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Adam Buckman, Networks in the Hunt for DVR-Proof Non-Sports Programming,
TVNEWSDAILY (June 22, 2015, 11:41 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/tele
vision-news-daily/edition/2015/06/22/?print [https://perma.cc/YL6N-HEPB] (“Live sports
comprise the most DVR-proof category of programming of them all, since the nature of
sports is antithetical to the concept of time-shifted TV watching.”).
36
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The consequence of this overlap appears to be a restraint on output; Nevada consumers have their broadcasting options limited by multiple competing
Clubs that have no Nevada connection (beyond casual fans in that particular
consumer base), all of which limit the Clubs’ home games to the RSN of their
choice within their HTT. This means that because Las Vegas has been deemed
a part of the Giants’ and the Diamondbacks’ HTT, consumers in Las Vegas
would have to subscribe to CSN Bay Area and Fox Sports Arizona in order to
watch these “in-market” games.43 In turn, the consumer’s ability to subscribe to
either RSN depends on whether his or her provider (e.g., DirecTV or Cox Cable) has successfully negotiated for the right to offer that RSN to its customers.
Though all of Nevada is subject to HTT division to some extent, this overlap creates the most disparate impact in Southern Nevada. Nevada consumers
who pay for presumably exhaustive “season ticket”-style broadcast subscriptions44 will be able to view all out-of-market games without issue. These same
consumers, however, will experience a blackout for all in-market games, unless
they subscribe to each of the in-market Clubs’ RSN broadcasting agreements.
In theory, this requires a Southern Nevada consumer who has presumably
paid for “all” MLB games to additionally purchase the telecast from each of the
six overlapping clubs’ RSN agreements to actually ensure access to those
games.45 Otherwise, all telecasts of the in-market games will be blacked out
pursuant to the MLB broadcast policy and, consequently, remain generally unavailable to paying consumers.46

43

While this is generally true, the authors recognize that, in prior seasons, live telecasts of
some Diamondbacks and Padres games have been available via simulcast to Cox Cable subscribers on a “Cox Community Channel”, which is not an RSN. In the past, more Padres
games than Diamondbacks games have been accessible in this manner. Currently, it is unknown how the Cox Community Channel obtained simulcast rights to these games, and it’s
unclear whether either the Diamondbacks or Padres will allow Cox Cable to continue offering any games via simulcast in the future. This limited exception appears to apply only to
Padres and Diamondbacks games; we found no evidence that any Dodgers, Angels, Giants
or Athletics games have ever been accessible in this manner in Southern Nevada.
44 The most notable of these is the popular “MLB Extra Innings” package provided by DirecTV which, as its promotional materials denote, provides “almost 100 out-of-market
games a week” to subscribers. MLB Extra Innings, DIRECTV, http://www.directv.com/spo
rts/mlb [https://perma.cc/AP59-U64R] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
45 In the past, this would have required a consumer to keep abreast of which television providers held contracts with which RSNs and (potentially) purchase channel packages from
multiple providers. However, the MLB has recently announced that it will begin offering
single team subscriptions so that fans can watch a team’s entire season without blackouts.
See Gershon Rabinowitz, Breaking Down MLB.TV’s Single Team Package, BASEBALL
ESSENTIAL (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.baseballessential.com/news/2016/01/05/breakingdown-mlb-tvs-single-team-package [https://perma.cc/3PKC-YVBE].
46 To date, only the in-market live game telecast was potentially available for any games
involving an in-market team. Pursuant to a pending class action settlement discussed infra,
consumers may now have the ability to watch the out-of-market team’s live telecast even
when the opponent is an in-market team (e.g., the ability to watch the Yankees telecast of a
Yankees-Giants matchup, rather than the Giants’ telecast). However, this option is condi-

DUNNING - 16 NEV. L.J. 1171 - FINAL

1180

6/20/2016 5:53 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:1171

D. In-Market vs. Out-of-Market Games
The HTTs’ impact on access to in-market games also restricts access to
out-of-market games, which is often disappointing to consumers who invest in
greater “season ticket”-style broadcasting subscriptions like the MLB’s own
“MLB Extra Innings” package.47 The distinction between in-market and out-ofmarket games is best understood by reference to a live game telecast of a specific MLB Club.
For illustrative purposes, we will again discuss the San Francisco Giants.
The Giants control the distribution of all live game telecasts of Giants games in
Northern Nevada as an “in-market” game, as Northern Nevada falls within the
Giants’ HTT.48 Accordingly, these games are only accessible in Northern Nevada through the Giants’ RSN—CSN Bay Area. Northern Nevada, however, is
outside of the designated HTT of the New York Yankees, so the telecast of all
live Yankees games in Northern Nevada is generally considered “out-ofmarket.” Because the Yankees do not have HTT control of Northern Nevada,
consumers in that region have other options for viewing most Yankees games,
including “season ticket”-style broadcast subscriptions. However, if the Yankees play the Giants, a Yankees fan living in Northern Nevada won’t be able to
view the live telecast of that game via the standard Extra Innings Package, because that game is considered an in-market game for the Giants.
In sum, the HTTs impact access to nearly every regular-season game
played by the six Clubs that claim Southern Nevada (and the two that claim
Northern Nevada). Access to these “in-market” games is restricted to fans of
those particular Clubs, but even fans of other Clubs have their access restricted
to certain “out-of-market” games if the opponent happens to be one of the six
Clubs claiming Southern Nevada.49
E. The Existence of an Adequate Product Market in Southern Nevada
In analyzing antitrust concerns posed by the HTTs present in Southern Nevada, it is necessary to evaluate whether an adequate product market exists for
antitrust purposes. The six MLB Clubs that claim Southern Nevada within their
HTTs impact access to nearly of all those teams’ live games in Southern Nevada, excluding games aired on ESPN and post-season and championship
games.50 Because those six Clubs are the only ones that claim Southern Nevationed on the consumer subscribing to the particular RSN that carries the in-market telecasts.
See infra notes 94, 97.
47 See MLB Extra Innings, supra note 44.
48 Grow, supra note 19.
49 Pursuant to a pending class action settlement, consumers may have more access to out-ofmarket games going forward, but that expanded access will still be subject to the HTTs, requiring that consumers subscribe to the RSN affiliated with an in-market team in order to
enjoy the benefits of expanded access to out-of-market games. See infra notes 94, 97.
50 See Maury Brown, 2009 Season Begins with MLB Blackout Policy Still a Bone of Contention, FOXSPORTS: THE BIZ OF BASEBALL (Mar. 26, 2009, 2:02 PM),
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da, there is a compelling argument that the live game telecasts of those Clubs
constitute a sufficient product market and geographic market in an antitrust
analysis.51 The geographic region is comprised of a significant portion of
Southern Nevada, including the entirety of Clark County and surrounding areas.52 The six Clubs that claim Southern Nevada exercise nearly complete control over all broadcasts of that type within that region.
There is a risk, however, that a broader product market is available because
the business generated by those Clubs alone constitutes merely 20 percent of all
competing Clubs nationally.53 Narrowing the market analysis to games played
by the respective clubs, the HTT restrictions impact roughly 40 percent of all
games broadcast in Southern Nevada (i.e., any live games that involve any of
the six Clubs).54
As an alternative to considering all MLB-generated business as the relevant
market, an argument can be made that there is a significant in-between market
for live game telecasts involving Clubs competing within the National League
West (NL West) and the American League West (AL West).55 All of the Clubs
that claim Southern Nevada are among the 10 total teams within the NL West
and the AL West. Defining the market according to these specific regional
leagues, rather than MLB coverage nationally, better exemplifies the impact of
the HTTs in the area: roughly 70 percent of league play in Southern Nevada is
restricted by this HTT overlap, a significant increase from the broader 20 percent estimation for nationwide competition.56
There are merits to either product market definition, but the acceptance of
the larger market serves to minimize the anticompetitive impact of the MLB’s
broadcasting restrictions. It is important in this analysis to again acknowledge
the fact that, despite the myriad broadcasting restrictions that impact Nevada
consumers, all restrictions are created by Clubs that have no physical presence
whatsoever in Nevada. This supports the more-narrow, “regional league” prodhttp://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3120:2009season-begins-with-mlb-blackout-policy-still-a-bone-of-contention&catid=48:ei-mlbnetwork&Itemid=82.
51 See generally Philip Nelson, Monopoly Power, Market Definition, and the Cellophane
Fallacy, U. S. DEP’T JUSTICE (June 25, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/monopoly-powermarket-definition-and-cellophane-fallacy [https://perma.cc/MA7B-CVE3].
52 See Grow, supra note 19.
53 Of the 30 national MLB Clubs nationally, the six teams claiming the Southern Nevada
region within their HTT represent 20 percent of the League’s teams. Id.
54 There are 30 Major League Baseball teams (15 teams in the NL and 15 teams in the AL)
and six teams claiming the region within their HTT (even in the smaller markets of the individual leagues and regions, six teams hold telecasting rights due to RSN agreements). Major
League Baseball Standings, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://www.si.com/mlb/standings?sea
son=2016&grouping=conference [http://perma.cc/3F4K-JXG8] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
55 Id.
56 See Wendy Thurm, MLB Strongly Defends Local Broadcast Territories in Court,
FANGRAPHS (May 23, 2014), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/mlb-strongly-defends-localbroadcast-territories-in-court [https://perma.cc/2FTA-BXDV].
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uct market analysis due to the fact that the overlapping HTT boundaries are a
consequence of regional Clubs claiming areas beyond their accepted (and defined) operating territories under the MLB Constitution. Because these encroaching HTT boundaries emanate from teams in the western region that are
within either the NL West or the AL West, the product market ought to be defined by live game telecasts within those leagues and the affected consumers of
those games.
III. THE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A. The Origins of the Major League Baseball Exemption and the Power
of Stare Decisis
Antitrust laws are a necessary and long-standing staple in American jurisprudence. Congress first enacted the Sherman Act, the cornerstone of antitrust
law, in 1890.57 The Sherman Act states, in relevant part, that “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”58 Antitrust laws are designed to protect the competitive
nature of business in a capitalist system, thereby protecting consumers from
exploitation.59 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that the Sherman Act was
designed to be a “consumer welfare prescription,” and that “[any] restraint that
has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer preference in setting
price and output is not consistent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law.”60
However, despite this emphasis on consumer welfare, the business of professional baseball has long been exempted from scrutiny under antitrust law.
This judicially-created exemption arose in 1922, when the United States Supreme Court decided Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League
of Prof’l Baseball Clubs.61 In Federal Baseball, the Court held that commercial
exhibition of baseball games were state events; because there was no interstate
commerce involved in baseball game exhibitions in 1922, they were not subject
to federal antitrust law at that time.62
57

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
Id.
59 See Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
31, 35 (2014) (“Today there is a wide consensus that the primary, if not exclusive, goal of
antitrust law is to promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare by deterring firms
from subverting the competitive process and thus deriving the power to reduce output, price
above competitive levels, and stymie innovation.”).
60 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107
(1984).
61 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
208–09 (1922).
62 Id. It is worth noting that the Federal Baseball opinion never uses the word “exemption;”
the holding was based simply on the Court’s determination of whether the subject matter involved interstate commerce.
58
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Over the next fifty years, the Supreme Court upheld and clarified the Baseball Exemption through two subsequent decisions. When deciding Toolson v.
New York Yankees, the first case to invoke the Baseball Exemption, the Court
further insulated the professional baseball industry from federal antitrust liability because, at the time, major league baseball had “been left for thirty years to
develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation.”63 Later, in Flood v. Kuhn, the Court acknowledged that the Baseball
Exemption is an “aberration” but again upheld the protection on the basis of
stare decisis:
Even though others might regard this as “unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical,” the aberration is an established one, and one that has been recognized not
only in Federal Baseball and Toolson, but in Shubert, International Boxing, and
Radovich, as well, a total of five consecutive cases in this Court. It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully
entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court’s expanding concept of interstate commerce. It rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs.64

In its reasoning, the Flood Court was careful to distinguish baseball from
other sports industries when it noted that “[o]ther professional sports operating
interstate—football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf—are
not so exempt.”65 The Court reasoned that Congress wanted the Baseball Exemption to endure, because Congress had not amended the Sherman Act to expressly include Major League Baseball after the decision in Federal Baseball.66
Therefore, the Flood Court opined that if Major League Baseball is ever to be
subject to the provisions of federal antitrust law, it would have to be through
express legislative action.67
When looked at in a vacuum, the Court’s decision in Flood solidly stands
on the grounds of separation of powers. The Sherman Act has been amended
numerous times since the Federal Baseball decision, and Congress has not subsequently sought to legislatively undo or clarify the Baseball Exemption.68
However, the continued existence of the Baseball Exemption seems to disregard the vast differences between modern Major League Baseball and the MLB
of the 1920s. In 1922, the Court had to consider whether the Sherman Act applied to baseball exhibitions in which the only interstate actions were transporting players from one stadium to another.69 Under those circumstances, it was

63

Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 356 (1953).
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (citation omitted) (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l
Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)).
65 Id. at 282–83.
66 Id. at 283.
67 Id.
68 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
69 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
208–09 (1922).
64
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reasonable for the Court to hold that the business of baseball was purely intrastate.70
However, in 1972—fifty years after Federal Baseball—the Flood Court
realized, and stated unequivocally, that “professional baseball is a business . . .
engaged in interstate commerce.”71 Because of this, the endurance of the Baseball Exemption rests on Major League Baseball’s reliance on its existence72 and
the presumption that subjecting the MLB to antitrust laws now—after letting it
develop for nearly 100 years under the assumption that it was exempt from antitrust regulation—would be inherently unfair.73
B. Distinguishing the Sports Broadcasting Act Exemption from the
Baseball Antitrust Exemption
Though Congress has not yet chosen to legislatively reverse or narrow the
longstanding Baseball Exemption, it has defined specific exemptions with regard to broadcasting activities. In 1961, Congress passed the Sports Broadcasting Act,74 which created a particularized exemption to the antitrust laws as applied to the televising of sporting events.
The Sports Broadcasting Act created an exemption that allows professional
sports teams that “sells or otherwise transfers” their rights in sponsored telecasting of games uninhibited by antitrust law.75 Section 1292, however, limits
this exemption by providing that the person to whom such rights are sold or
transferred cannot be prohibited from televising the games within any area.76
As a caveat to this limitation, § 1292 also preserves each team’s right to impose
restrictions on the telecasting of games “within the home territory of a member
club of the league on a day when such club is playing a game at home.”77
Importantly, the antitrust exemption provided by § 1291 applies only to
“sponsored telecasting” of a team’s games and is inapplicable to non-sponsored
telecasting.78 As the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California noted, the term “sponsored telecasting” refers to over-the-air (free
70

It may be worth noting that the first radio broadcast of a major league baseball game occurred on August 5, 1921, less than one year before Federal Baseball was argued and decided. Christopher H. Sterling, Radio Broadcasting, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/topic/radio/Juvenile-action-and-adventure-series#ref1123774
[https://perma.cc/X9MB-V84T]. It may further be worth noting that this original 1921
broadcast was of a game between two Pennsylvania teams. Id.
71 Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
72 Brent Kendall, Major League Baseball Scores Victory at Supreme Court, WALL STREET J.
(Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/major-league-baseball-scores-victory-insupreme-court-ruling-1444054214.
73 See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
74 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–95.
75 Id. § 1291.
76 Id. § 1292.
77 Id.
78 Kingray v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 188 F. Supp.2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
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broadcasting), and non-sponsored telecasting refers to national cable (pay)
broadcasting.79 Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York also relied on this distinction in Laumann v. National Hockey
League, which held that the antitrust exemption provided by § 1291 did not apply to the telecasting of out-of-market games.80
In sum, the exemption provided by the Sports Broadcasting Act does not
extend to channels of distribution such as cable television, pay-per-view, and
satellite television networks.81 In order to watch the games of the six Clubs that
claim Southern Nevada as a home TV territory, Nevada consumers must subscribe to one of the affiliated RSNs, all of which are non-sponsored forms of
telecasting.
Accordingly, the Sports Broadcasting Act exemption is inapplicable to the
broadcasting of MLB clubs via RSNs, and antitrust concerns raised by MLB
broadcasting activities rest strictly within the purview of the preexisting Baseball Exemption.82 Similar to the exemption provided by the Sports Broadcasting Act, however, the Baseball Exemption has not developed without challenges along the way.
C. Recent Criticisms and Legal Challenges to the Baseball Exemption
The history of the Baseball Exemption has garnered significant criticism
from the legal community and has been the subject of more recent limitations
to its scope. Notably, in 1982, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas acknowledged, in Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston
Sports Ass’n, that the baseball antitrust exemption has little place in modernity
beyond the principle of stare decisis.83 The court acknowledged the longstanding presumption against exemptions to the antitrust laws, as well as the heightened burden placed upon defendants to prove that their actions are actually exempted from those laws.84
The court also observed that other courts had limited the Baseball Exemption as applicable only to those aspects of baseball that are integral to the sport,
and that it does not extend to “related activities which merely enhance its
commercial success.”85 The Houston Sports court further noted that the Supreme Court, in creating the Baseball Exemption, implied that broadcasting activities are “not central enough to baseball to be encompassed in the baseball
79

Id.
Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 1292–95.
82 See Wendy Thurm, MLB Strongly Defends Local Broadcast Territories in Court,
FANGRAPHS (May 23, 2014), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/mlb-strongly-defends-localbroadcast-territories-in-court [https://perma.cc/5RS4-ZTUR].
83 Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 267 (S.D. Tex.
1982).
84 Id. at 265.
85 Id.
80
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exemption.”86 This 1982 approach to broadcasting, despite pertaining specifically to radio broadcasts, is particularly instructive when it comes to evaluating
the current state of MLB television broadcasting restrictions.
In addition to the Houston Sports court’s perceived limitations to the scope
of the Baseball Exemption, more contemporary precedent supports the inapplicability of the Baseball Exemption to live game telecasts. For example, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction between the NFL and its
aggregate teams in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League.87 In
that case, the Court held that the numerous teams comprising the NFL should
not be treated as a single entity for purposes of claims under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act with regards to marketing of the teams’ individually owned intellectual property.88 Although the opinion did not address the historical exemption of baseball from the antitrust laws, legal scholars have already concluded
that the American Needle holding indicates an increased willingness by the Supreme Court to both subject sports leagues to antitrust inquiry and to analyze
their actions under the rule of reason test.89
Under traditional antitrust analysis,90 the “rule of reason” test is used to determine whether the allegedly anticompetitive behavior unreasonably restrains
trade.91 Unlike actions that are considered to be illegal per se,92 courts analyze
actions under the rule of reason based upon totality of the circumstances.93 The
American Needle court’s decision to apply the rule of reason test to sports
leagues’ activity indicates that a fact-dependent analysis of the overall anticompetitive effect of commercial activities may eventually supplant the historical exemption to antitrust inquiry.
Perhaps more importantly, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York relied on the holding in American Needle when concluding that “[t]he fact that the NHL and MLB are lawful joint ventures does not
preclude plaintiffs from challenging the Leagues’ particular policies under the
rule of reason.”94 In so ruling, the court extended the American Needle holding
86

Id. at 265, 267.
560 U.S. 183, 186 (2010).
88 Id.
89 Michael J. Mozes & Ben Glicksman, Adjusting the Stream? Analyzing Major League
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption After American Needle, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 265,
290 (2011).
90 See infra Part IV.
91 See infra Part IV.
92 See infra Part IV.
93 See infra Part IV.
94 Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Note that
the Laumann case was filed as Case No. 1:12-cv-01817-SAS in the Southern District of New
York. A separate class action, Garber vs. MLB, was filed as Case No. 1:12-cv-03704-SAS in
the Southern District of New York. The two cases were later consolidated, with court opinions pertaining to both issued under the Laumann case name (as cited throughout). The
Laumann class plaintiffs reached a settlement with the NHL in 2015, while the Garber class
plaintiffs continued litigation until their recent settlement with MLB. See infra note 97.
87
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to include the live telecast markets in professional baseball and professional
hockey.95 NHL live game telecasts were also the subject of the court’s analysis,
and the court importantly drew parallels between the NHL and the MLB, particularly with regard to their respective telecasting arrangements.96 This comparison served to acknowledge how similarly situated these sports leagues are
in the market, and raised further questions about the applicability of the Baseball Exemption to the benefit of one league—and one sport—over another.
Recently, a class of plaintiffs sued the MLB and affiliated sports broadcasters in Garber v. MLB, raising factual and legal allegations that are parallel
to the circumstances in Southern Nevada.97 In the Garber case, two classes of
plaintiffs alleged that, due to the HTTs, they were subjected to unreasonably
high prices and an unreasonable number of “blacked out” games.98 The most
95

Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
Id. at 488.
97 Class Action Complaint at 2–8, Laumann, 907 F.Supp.2d 465 (2012) (No. 12 Civ 3704
(SAS)); Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 471. It is important to note that, as of the time of this
writing, MLB and the Garber class plaintiffs have filed a proposed class action settlement
agreement, and a fairness hearing is currently scheduled for April 25, 2016 for the court’s
approval. The proposed settlement terms provide various degrees of relief for the plaintiff
classes. First, the settlement will allow, but not require, Comcast and DirecTV to offer single
team television packages alongside a league-wide “MLB Extra Innings”-type package at a
discounted rate. Second, MLB.tv, Comcast, and DirecTV will provide an add-on option for
subscribers to a league-wide package that allows users to “Follow Your Team” and view all
telecasts of a specific out-of-market club, similar to the television option. Yet, both the single-team and “Follow Your Team” options are subject to the HTTs and exclusive rights of
in-market Clubs; i.e., the full benefit of either option can only be realized by also subscribing
to the RSN of the respective in-market team(s). Class Action Settlement Agreement, Garber
v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d 334 (2014) (No. 12 Civ 3704 (SAS))
(S.D.N.Y. Jan 20, 2016) (identifying settlement terms between the Garber plaintiffs and defendants in the Laumann case, as proposed for court approval).
Third (in more limited circumstances) consumers who do not have access to pertinent
distributors (part of a market of “Unserved Fans”) will have the option to purchase in-market
telecasts via MLB.tv without having to subscribe to an unavailable intermediary RSN, subject to MLB verifying that such consumer truly has no available access to a distributor.
Fourth, the proposed settlement identifies MLB price relief for MLB.tv and MLB Extra Innings packages for standard out-of-market games with limitations on price increases in upcoming years. It is worth noting that, though numerous proposed provisions are geared to the
internet plaintiffs, some consumers may have equivalent cable recourse through television
streaming devices like Roku, Apple TV, proprietary “smart TV” software, and other internet-to-television options. Id.
The settlement provisions, however, are subject to certain limitations. Notably, the duration of the relief offered is limited to only five years beginning with either the 2016 or
2017 baseball season (depending on the particular settlement term). Additionally, not all
teams’ telecasts are covered by the settlement; only a portion of RSNs are owned by the Defendants to whom the terms apply. Arguably most importantly, however, the HTT scheme
that underpinned the Garber case and posture the Southern Nevada in-market overlap remains untouched. The existence and scope of the HTT boundaries and the consequent blackouts will continue, presumably allowing RSNs to retain their local bargaining power
throughout the settlement period and after its duration. Id.
98 Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
96
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analogous class is comprised of consumers who purchased cable packages
through television providers like Comcast and DirecTV with the expectation of
watching live baseball game broadcasts.99 Plaintiffs allege, and other observers
agree,100 that the MLB’s ability to enter into exclusive contracts with television
networks pressures consumers into purchasing both cable subscriptions and
out-of-market cable packages to account for the blackout. The result is a functional “double-dipping” by the League due to their elimination of competition
amongst broadcasters,101 and an apparent restraint of trade.
Even more recently, the Laumann court explicitly rejected the MLB’s argument that the historical Baseball Exemption should apply to live game telecasts.102 In support of its decision to patently reject the applicability of the ninety-two-year-old Baseball Exemption, the court noted a prior instance in which
the scope of the Baseball Exemption was narrowed: “[i]n 1998, Congress
passed the Curt Flood Act, which effectively removed employment-related
agreements from the baseball exemption. The Act did not alter the applicability
of the antitrust laws to ‘any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than
. . . employment of major league baseball players.’ ”103
Simply put, courts seem less content than ever to resign rule of reason
analyses to the principle of stare decisis alone. These recent decisions may
provide a solid foundation for future challenges to the Baseball Exemption.104
99

Id.; Nathan M. Hennagin, Blackout or Blackmail? How Garber v. MLB Will Shed Light
on Major League Baseball’s Broadcasting Cartel, 8 BROOK. J. CORP,. FIN. & COM. L. 158,
175 (2013).
100 See Hennagin, supra note 99, at 159 (arguing in 2013 that the Garber plaintiffs should
prevail against the MLB in the Southern District of New York notwithstanding the Baseball
Exemption); see also Jeff Passan, TV Blackouts Case Against MLB at Critical Point,
YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 21, 2012, 1:41 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/tv-blackoutcase-against-mlb-at-critical-point.html [https://perma.cc/RVL9-L5ND]. In that article, sports
journalist Jeff Passan opined that, upon the filing of the Garber complaint, the case represented “the workaround code for the working person.” Id. (claiming that Garber “[was] the
suit behind which every baseball fan should stand. It’s 2012, where everything is available
everywhere, and pure greed is keeping baseball off our TVs, our tablets, our laptops and our
phones. If baseball refuses to budge on an issue so archaic, so absurd and so blatant in its
indifference toward people who want to buy one of their products, the league should suffer
through the embarrassment of getting clowned by the fans whom it clowns with black TV
screens. It may move slowly—most antitrust lawsuits do—but if this succeeds, it will be a
decades-forward leap in one fell swoop.”). As discussed supra, the proposed settlement in
the Laumann case (with which the Garber claims were consolidated), indicated incremental
change and a potential step in the right direction, just not necessarily the “decades-forward
leap” that proponents hoped for. In the meantime, the Southern Nevada HTT overlap remains untouched, albeit illuminated.
101 Hennagin, supra note 99, at 175.
102 Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 12 Civ. 3704 (SAS), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 133743, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2014) (denying MLB’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and holding that the exemption is inapplicable to broadcasting activities).
103 Id. at *3 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)).
104 Eriq Gardner, Judge Rules MLB’s Antitrust Exemption Doesn’t Apply to Television
Broadcast
Rights,
HOLLYWOOD
REP.
(Aug.
9,
2014,
9:04
AM)
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IV. THE BASEBALL EXEMPTION AND NEVADA
A. Revisiting Traditional Antitrust Analysis
The Clayton Act permits private parties to institute actions under the federal antitrust laws for damages and injunctive relief.105 However, a private plaintiff only has standing to enforce Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act if he or
she suffered antitrust injury and is a proper party to bring suit.106 In making this
determination, a court must “evaluate the plaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between them.”107
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court laid out a five-factor test to
determine whether a plaintiff had proper standing to invoke the protection of
the antitrust laws.108 First, a plaintiff must show that his alleged injury is “of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”109
However, suffering an antitrust injury alone not necessarily sufficient for a
plaintiff to have standing.110 Once a plaintiff has cleared that initial hurdle, he
must then show that he is a proper plaintiff in light of four “efficient enforcer”
factors:
(1) ‘the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury;’ (2) ‘the existence of an
identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them
to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement;’ (3) the speculativeness
of the alleged injury; and (4) the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries.111

http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-rules-mlbs-antitrust-exemption-724368
[https://perma.cc/F2SE-WJGT].
105 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27.
106 15 U.S.C. § 15; see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois , 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977) (holding that
indirect purchasers do not have standing to sue for antitrust injuries).
107 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 535 (1983). Section 4 of the Clayton Act broadly defines who may maintain a private
action for treble damages under the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15. Although a prospective
private plaintiff may be able to evidence that it suffered an antitrust injury and is entitled to
injunctive relief, additional factors must be met for the plaintiff to have standing to pursue
treble damages.
108
109

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 nn. 5–6 (1986) (“[A] showing
of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient.”).
111 Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 66 (2d Cir.
1988). The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that the court must weigh five factors when considering standing: “(1) the nature of the plaintiff’s alleged injury; that is, whether it was the
type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) the
speculative measure of harm; (4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and (5) the complexity in
apportioning damages.” Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 190 F.3d 1051, 1054–55 (9th
Cir. 1999).
110
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These factors only determine whether a plaintiff’s claim will be heard. Actually succeeding on the merits, however, is an entirely different hurdle.
B. Applying Section 1 of the Sherman Act
As discussed above, section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States.”112 The Supreme Court has
clarified that Section 1 “outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.”113 To establish
a Section 1 violation, a plaintiff must allege (1) “ ‘a combination or some form
of concerted action between at least two legally distinct economic entities’ that
(2) ‘constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade either per se or under the rule
of reason.’ ”114
Certain agreements that courts, after “considerable experience with the
type of restraint at issue,” determine to have “manifestly anti-competitive effects . . . and lack . . . any redeeming virtue,” are deemed per se violations of
the Sherman Act.115 Such Sherman Act violations are considered to be “necessarily illegal.”116 However, if an alleged trade restraint falls outside this “necessarily illegal” category, “[t]he rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing
whether a practice restrains trade in violation of § 1.”117 “The rule [of reason]
distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to
the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s
best interest.”118 A court must “determine whether the . . . restriction is a naked
restraint on trade, and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and
competitive purposes of the business association and thus valid.”119
The Supreme Court adopted the following burden-shifting approach for the
rule of reason:
[P]laintiffs bear an initial burden to demonstrate the defendants’ challenged behavior had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant
market . . . . [E]vidence that plaintiffs have been harmed as individual competitors will not suffice. . . . If the plaintiffs satisfy their initial burden, the burden
shifts to the defendants to offer evidence of the pro-competitive effects of their
112

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original); see 15 U.S.C. § 1.
114 Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir.
1993)).
115 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Categorizing a restraint as per se illegal “eliminates the
need to study the reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at
work.” Id.
116 Id. at 886–87.
117 Id. at 885.
118 Id.
119 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 (2006).
113
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agreement . . . . Assuming defendants can provide such proof, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiffs to prove that any legitimate competitive benefits offered by
defendants could have been achieved through less restrictive means.120

Finally, as an alternative to “per se” and “rule of reason” analyses, certain
challenged practices warrant an “abbreviated or quick-look rule of reason analysis.”121 This “quick-look” analysis occurs in situations when a more thorough
review is unwarranted “because the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects
can be easily ascertained”122 or in situations where the “restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all . . . [therefore] the
agreement is likely to survive the Rule of Reason.”123 The “quick-look” analysis has been summarized as one that is applicable if
“an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets.”. . . It is not appropriate, however, where the anticompetitive effects of an agreement are not obvious or [the agreement] may “have a
net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition.”124

C. Consumer Protection Laws in Nevada
Nevada provided many consumer protections through its enactment of the
Nevada Unfair Trade Practices Act (NUTPA), which largely echoes, and is
read in concert with, federal antitrust law.125 Nevada Revised Statute section
598A.060(1)(b) prohibits division of markets, inclusive of agreements between
competitors to divide territories.126 Additionally, NRS section 598A.060(1)(c)
prohibits allocation of customers, including agreements between competitors
not to sell to specified customers of a competitor.127
120

Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. (Salvino II), 542 F.3d 290, 317 (2nd
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). In making this determination “the factfinder weighs
all of the circumstances of a case” including “specific information about the relevant business . . . the restraint’s history, nature, and effect . . . and [w]hether the businesses involved
have market power.” Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886–87 (citations omitted).
121 Salvino (Salvino II), 542 F.3d at 317.
122 Id. The Supreme Court found an abbreviated analysis appropriate where a plan expressly
limited the number of college football games that could be televised and fixed a minimum
price for those games. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 106–10 (1984) (holding that no “detailed market analysis” was necessary
to find that the NCAA’s television broadcasting plan placed a facial restraint on trade that
had the effect of “utterly destroy[ing] free market competition.”).
123 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (noting that the
Rule of Reason “can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye” and that certain “features of the NFL may save agreements amongst the teams . . . for example . . . the interest in
maintaining a competitive balance”) (citations omitted).
124 Major League Baseball Props., Inc v. Salvino Inc. (Salvino I), 420 F.Supp.2d 212, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770–71 (1999)).
125 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A (2010), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012), and 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12–27 (2012).
126 NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.060(1)(b) (2010).
127 NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.060(1)(c) (2010).
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The MLB Constitution,128 with its aforementioned provisions concerning
HTTs, is functionally an agreement among the MLB and competing MLB
Clubs, and the designation of HTTs is a division of both markets and the consumers residing within them.129 It would appear as though, by these divisions,
the MLB and the RSNs are violating NUTPA. This market allocation seemingly supports a conspiracy claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act as well,
though such claims are impractical to bring and are rarely pursued.130
As addressed in the Introduction, this Article seeks to identify an issue that
disproportionately impacts Nevadans, and to gauge whether an analysis under
the rule of reason would empower a court—state or federal—to find the MLB’s
activity violative of the antitrust laws. Though there is no obvious answer or
solution; there are only potentially anticompetitive issues related to MLB telecasting in Nevada. The legality of these issues, however, is dependent on a variety of factors including, as discussed above, the election of the proper analysis, the definition of the relevant product market, and the indication of the
specific injury to competition necessitating the application of antitrust law.
D. Looking Away from Per Se Illegality and a “Quick Look”
Courts have traditionally viewed certain actions, including horizontal customer allocation and horizontal territorial allocation, to be illegal per se.131
However, the per se rule does not necessarily apply when the alleged conduct is
taken by professional, or organized amateur, sports leagues. As discussed
above, courts have increasingly recognized that the business of organized
sports leagues encompasses industries in which some horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.132 Furthermore,
courts’ hesitation to apply the per se analysis absent “considerable experience”
with that particular type of restraint renders per se illegality inappropriate when
applied to a somewhat novel broadcasting discussion.133
By contrast, the “quick look” analysis, which is employed as a truncated
rule of reason analysis, is likely inapplicable to MLB telecasting arrangements.
A number of courts have found the “quick look” analysis to be inapplicable to
128

MAJOR
LEAGUE
CONST.
art.
VIII,
§ 9,
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/League%20Constitutions
%20&%20Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4S-EX5R ]
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
129 See Id. arts. III, IX.
130 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
131 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T. JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANTITRUST
RESOURCE MANUAL § 8, http://www.justice.gov/usam/antitrust-resource-manual-8-identify
ing-sherman-act-violations [https://perma.cc/JU47-73S6] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
132 Am. Needle, Inc., v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202–04 (2010) (holding that,
“[w]hen ‘restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,’ per se
rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the
flexible Rule of Reason”).
133 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007).
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the business of organized sports leagues because, in the language of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Major League Baseball Prop., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc.,
“the casual observer could not summarily conclude” that the arrangements in
question had an anticompetitive effect on customers.134 The telecasting discussion at issue, despite having received a less-than-positive reaction from the media and consumers alike, is not apparently anticompetitive to the extent that the
“quick look” analysis is applicable.135 It does not appear that there has been
sufficient legal development on the telecasting issue or information on the anticompetitive impact of these broadcasting restrictions to relegate the antitrust
analysis to a mere “casual observ[ation].”136
As discussed above, since 1984 the “rule of reason” analysis has been applied with greater frequency to gauge the anticompetitive nature of business activities in professional organized sports.137 With that in mind, and given the developments in the Laumann v. National Hockey League case, this discussion is
best addressed within the context of the “rule of reason.”138 Even so, employing
the rule of reason rather than a per se analysis does not change the ultimate focus of a court’s inquiry; in both cases, the construct is applied “to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint”139
E. The Rule of Reason Absent the Baseball Exemption—Analyzing the
Circumstances Rather than Ignoring the Problem
If presented with a legal challenge from Southern Nevada consumer plaintiffs, a court could, consistent with the Supreme Court’s perspective on organized professional and collegiate sports leagues as stated in American Needle140
and NCAA,141 apply the rule of reason test and reexamine broadcasting with a
critical eye toward the Baseball Exemption.142 In Laumann, the Southern District of New York repeatedly acknowledged the appropriate application of the
rule of reason in the context of live game telecasts.143 The court indicated that
134

542 F.3d 290, 307 (2008).
Gardner, supra note 104.
136 Salvino (Salvino II), 542 F.3d at 307.
137 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107
(1984).
138 Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
139 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 103 (1984) (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
140 See generally American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
141 See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85.
142 See generally American Needle, 560 U.S. 183.
143 Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 485, 488. In denying the MLB’s Motion to Dismiss, the
Court was critical of the MLB’s “legitimate joint ventures” argument, in which defendants
argues that “the production and distribution of live telecasts of games—is ‘core activity’
immune from antitrust scrutiny.” Id. at 488. The court explained that “the notion that ‘the
exhibition of [ ] league games on television and the Internet’ is clearly a ‘league issue’ is
contrary to longstanding precedent that agreements limiting the telecasting of professional
135
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inherently anticompetitive broadcasting agreements, even those that are essential for the product to be available at all, do not warrant blanket immunity from
antitrust scrutiny.144
A United States District Court could, for example, analyze issues similar to
those presented in Garber,145 with an eye toward the disproportionate impact of
the HTT overlap as it pertains to the Southern Nevada market. Pursuant to
NCAA and consistent with the Laumann146 court’s analysis, the court could examine whether MLB inter-club contracting with RSNs within their respective
HTTs presents a horizontal restraint on competition147 and market allocation
that is violative of antitrust law.
The court would be able to examine what justifications exist for the origin
and broad scope of the HTTs. The court could further evaluate whether the establishment of HTTs, and the resulting exclusive agreements between MLB
Clubs and their RSNs that allow RSNs to sell telecasting rights to distributors,
restricts competition amongst RSNs for live game telecasts, the entry of new
RSNs and alternative intermediaries for broadcast right distribution, and competition between Clubs for viewership in a given territory. The court would
have an opportunity to analyze the reality that, in order to access additional
programming, the end consumer has to “buy in” to an RSN’s regional monopoly by purchasing broadcasting packages with another in-market distributor
and/or out-of-market game packages. The court could additionally analyze the
consequences of these agreements, including price impacts on the end consumer and potential “double-dipping,”148 as they pertain to the six-Club HTT overlap in Southern Nevada.
Southern Nevada consumers could argue that the MLB-HTT arrangements
arbitrarily create artificial demand for a product, and that the price for the product (i.e., the price to subscribe to an RSN) is based on manufactured demand
rather than actual demand. Consumers can further emphasize how the HTTs
require consumers to pursue broadcasting from numerous distributors, or
switch from one distributor to another, for access to live games because six
clubs have exclusive broadcasting authority within the region. Consumers
sports games are subject to antitrust scrutiny, and analyzed under the rule of reason.” Id. The
court noted that, “[e]ven if certain agreements by sports leagues with respect to telecasting
games may be ‘essential if the product is to be available at all’ this does not give league
agreements regarding television rights blanket immunity from antitrust scrutiny.” Id.
144 Id. at 488.
145 See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85.
146 See generally Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465.
147 Many courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have recognized that “a horizontal agreement
that allocates a market between competitors and ‘restrict[s] each company’s ability to compete for the other’s [business]’ may injure competition.” Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc.,
675 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2012).
148 The consequences of which, as alleged by the Laumann Plaintiffs, are reduced output,
raising prices, and rendering output as “unresponsive to consumer preference to view live
. . . games, including local games, through both internet and television media.” Laumann,
907 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
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could also argue that the agreements allow RSNs and their affiliated Clubs to
charge supracompetitive prices due to the RSNs’ exclusive control of in-market
broadcasts. Additionally, consumers could pursue an “output control” theory as
did the Laumann149 plaintiffs, arguing that clubs are unreasonably restricted
from telecasting their out-of-market games beyond their MLB-drawn territory,
irrespective of consumer demand. The consequence is the unreasonable further
stifling of competition by consolidating out-of-market broadcast agreements
through the MLB.
The court could also look to the Supreme Court’s findings in NCAA and
observe the striking similarities between the underlying facts in that case and
the impact of the HTTs on consumers in Southern Nevada. Specifically, the
NCAA court found that the NCAA’s television plan restricted the ability of
NCAA members to sell television rights, and absent those restrictions, many
more games would have been shown on television.150 Thus, the television plan
was an output restriction having the effect of raising the prices paid for television rights.151 Further, the NCAA’s price structure was unresponsive to viewer
demand and unrelated to the prices that would prevail in a competitive market.152 Finally, the television plan dictated who was able to procure television
rights, which effectively destroyed free market competition for live game telecasts.153
To proceed with a private consumer challenge, Southern Nevadans would
need to establish that they have antitrust standing. In a vacuum, this complaint
would allege that the consumer experienced a blackout as a consequence of the
MLB’s HTT designation, and that broadcasters charged supracompetitive prices for the consumer to view the desired games. The court would look for circumstances as discussed above: a consumer who has purchased presumably
comprehensive broadcasting of live games is forced to pay a supracompetitive
amount to secure the ability to watch any one of the six teams who claim
Southern Nevada within their HTT through a distributor secured via an exclusive RSN agreement. Southern Nevadans can align their complaint with the arguments presented by the Laumann154 plaintiffs by articulating injuries to competition with regard to distribution agreements of both in- and out-of-market
games.
A Southern Nevada consumer-based challenge would allow a prospective
class from a disproportionately impacted market to subject the archaic Baseball
Exemption to further judicial scrutiny. Provided that a plaintiff class could satisfy its initial burden of establishing a violation of antitrust law—the burden
would then shift to the MLB, its respective Clubs, and RSNs to either: (1) pro149
150
151
152
153
154

See generally id.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 105.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 108.
See generally Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465.
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vide evidence of the pro-competitive effects of the HTTs and resulting broadcasting agreements; or, if no such effect exists, (2) evidence how, absent the
protections of the Baseball Exemption, the restraints posed by these agreements
are essential for live game telecasts to be available at all. In short, a Southern
Nevada challenge could allow courts to revisit the issues posed, and left yet unresolved, by the Laumann case while highlighting the additional impacts particular to the Southern Nevada market.155
F. Consumer Recourse
Unfortunately, one of the biggest problems for baseball fans is that the
Baseball Exemption, and the lack of transparency in broadcasting agreements,
leaves consumers without apparent avenues of recovery.156
For example, the Oakland A’s recently explored the possibility of moving
to a new stadium in San Jose.157 The MLB blocked the move, determining that
San Jose fell squarely within the operating territory of the San Francisco Giants.158 To relocate to another team’s territory, at least three-fourths of MLB
Clubs must agree to the A’s proposed move.159 Although the City of San Jose
brought suit against the MLB, asserting that the Baseball Exemption did not
extend to the issue of franchise relocation, the courts were not persuaded.160 After losing in both the federal district court161 and the Ninth Circuit,162 the City
of San Jose appealed to the United State Supreme Court in the hopes that the

155

See generally id.
It is not just MLB fans who find themselves without recourse; even MLB teams are beholden to the anomalistic features of the Baseball Exemption, as discussed supra note 5.
157 Zachary Zagger, San Jose Loss Shows MLB Antitrust Immunity Is Here to Stay, LAW360,
(October 6, 2015, 9:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/711475/san-jose-loss-showsmlb-antitrust-immunity-is-here-to-stay [https://perma.cc/LY8U-LLNU].
158 Id.
159 MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 9, http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/SportsEnt
Law_Institute/League%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2005Update
.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4S-EX5R] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
160 San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686, 687 (9th Cir. 2015) cert
denied 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015) (“The City of San Jose steps up to the plate to challenge the
baseball industry’s 92-year old exemption from the antitrust laws. It joins the long line of
litigants that have sought to overturn one of federal law’s most enduring anomalies.”).
161 San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 5:13-cv-02787-RMW, 2014 WL
7670300 at *1 (Jan. 3, 2014 N.D. Cal.).
162 Affirming the district court’s dismissal of the majority of San Jose’s claims against the
MLB based upon the Baseball Exemption, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:
156

Like Casey, San Jose has struck out here. The scope of the Supreme Court’s holding in Flood
plainly extends to questions of franchise relocation. San Jose is, at bottom, asking us to deem
Flood wrongly decided, and that we cannot do. Only Congress and the Supreme Court are empowered to question Flood’s continued vitality, and with it, the fate of baseball’s singular and
historic exemption from the antitrust laws.

San Jose, 776 F.3d at 692.
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Court would reconsider its stance that the “business of baseball” was above antitrust law; the Court denied certiorari.163
In the current landscape, it seems as though consumers—both private individuals and business owners—are stuck. Traditional avenues of consumer recovery—such as private litigation, state parens patriae actions,164 direct customer complaints, and the like—provide little reprieve from corporate activity
that remains untouched due to the standing Exemption. Consumers of other traditional goods and services, like an individual shopping for a used car, may be
protected by state lemon laws165 or can—at the very least—file a complaint
with the Better Business Bureau.166 Here, the unanticipated content drought is
one bolstered by a nearly 100-year-old status quo.
For the time being, Southern Nevada consumers looking to enjoy up to 40
percent of live MLB game telecasts must hope that their cable or satellite providers have contracted with the proper RSNs chosen by the six teams staking
claim to the region. Unfortunately, with the Baseball Exemption firmly in place
and few legal challenges on the horizon,167 baseball fans—like our hypothetical
163

See generally Zagger, supra note 157; see also San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of
Baseball, 136 S. Ct. 36.
164 Some State Attorneys General pursue parens patriae actions on behalf of citizens for
antitrust violations and deceptive trade practices. Though not considered to be a direct remedy to the consumer, state representative actions have been regarded as a significant preventative measure and deterrent against anticompetitive corporate behavior. See generally JAY L.
HIMES, STATE PARENS PATRIAE AUTHORITY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S AUTHORITY (2004), http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-state
/pdf/publications/other-pubs/parens.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU4V-LECH].
In some circumstances, parens patriae actions can yield more direct benefits to consumers
by bolstering the State coffers with funds earmarked to address the harm caused by the anticompetitive action. For example, State Attorneys General were integral in the joint state and
federal settlements involving residential mortgage foreclosures and loan servicing, informally known collectively as “the National Mortgage Settlement.” See Joint State-Federal National Mortgage Servicing Settlements, NAT’L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, http://www.national
mortgagesettlement.com [https://perma.cc/HRR2-BZ5C] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). Of the
$57,368,430 settlement Nevada garnered in one of those suits, roughly $11.7 million was
earmarked to create a dedicated call center staffed by housing counselors. See National
Mortgage Settlement Summary, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/re
search/financial-services-and-commerce/national-mortgage-settlement-summary.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9D2A-EM95] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016); see also About Home Again,
HOME AGAIN NEV. HOMEOWNER RELIEF PROGRAM, http://www.homeagainnevada.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/TNS9-H4WG] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). The funds provided some recourse to Nevada consumers through the development of resources for those who may have
been impacted by the residential mortgage crisis. Id.
165 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.682–688 (2010) (Nevada’s lemon law buyback statute,
providing traditional protections for consumers purchasing defective motor vehicles).
166 BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org [https://perma.cc/QD52-KZG7] (last visited
Apr. 27, 2016) (a well-known nonprofit organization focusing on consumer protection by
consolidating customer reviews and facilitating dispute resolution through industry selfregulation).
167 It is worth reiterating that, at the time of this writing, the Laumann case in the Southern
District of New York was approaching settlement approval rather than proceeding to trial.
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Cardinals fan Phil—may have to suffer broadcasting blackouts for the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION
It may seem as though challenging the Baseball Exemption is a Sisyphean
effort,168 given the enduring reliance on stare decisis. However, as detailed
above, legislative efforts are starting to narrow the broad reach of the Baseball
Exemption. Perhaps more importantly, the 1972 Flood decision acknowledged
that baseball is a business, and that—as a business—it is engaged in interstate
commerce.169 Thus, the foundation for change has already been laid. The Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari to the City of San Jose need not be
the harbinger of enduring futility that some believe it to be; although the Court
declined to review the application of the Baseball Exemption in the context of a
franchise relocation, the Court has yet to hear a consumer-based challenge.
Despite the Supreme Court’s hesitation in overturning or limiting the
Baseball Exemption, it is possible that a consumer-based challenge would implicate principles of antitrust law that previous lawsuits have not. While some
courts have thought it unfair to extinguish the Baseball Exemption, after letting
the MLB operate under its guise for nearly a century, only Judge Scheindlin of
the Southern District of New York has witnessed firsthand the manner in which
the MLB treats its fans under the protections afforded to them by their perceived immunity.170 Although the pending settlement will likely allow the
MLB to avoid adjudication on the merits, Judge Scheindlin’s opinion was clear;
unilaterally and arbitrarily allocating consumers among Clubs, and using those
allocations to manufacture demand is not part and parcel “the business of baseball.”171

See generally Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (2012). The proposed
settlement terms discussed in supra note 97 do not impact the HTT designations in Nevada,
and the resolution of the matter leaves the application of the Baseball Exemption untested for
higher courts.
168 The authors note that challenging the longstanding exemption outright, regardless of the
legal grounds, is likely an act of futility. In circumstances like those presented in Southern
Nevada at the time of writing, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which any possible antitrust violation has occurred, only that principles of antitrust law are evoked by an apparent
impact on competition and ultimate consumers. Taking this situation as an opportunity to
invalidate, in its entirety, one of the principles upon which the business of Major League
Baseball has developed is not unlike the mythical plight of Sisyphus: an uphill battle that
will invariably leave challengers exactly where they started. See Sisyphus, ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Sisyphus [https://perma.cc/Q4MR-3WER]
(last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (summarizing the Greek myth of Sisyphus, a king of Corinth who
was punished in death by having to eternally push a boulder up a hill only to have it roll back
down to where he began).
169 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
170 Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465.
171 Id.
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If a consumer class brought suit challenging the anticompetitive effects of
the HTTs—specifically, asserting that their existence has unlawfully restrained
trade by restricting output and inflating prices disproportionately in Southern
Nevada compared to other markets—the Court may be compelled to apply a
rule of reason analysis to the application of the Baseball Exemption on live
game telecasts. This could result in a long-overdue reassessment of the Baseball Exemption, and could benefit Southern Nevada baseball fans.
Recent challenges like the Laumann172 case indicate that consumers around
the country are dissatisfied, and that courts are becoming progressively more
receptive to evaluating the Baseball Exemption in light of its current impact rather than the historical status that has allowed it to survive to this day.173
The appropriate remedy, at least for Southern Nevada, could be derived
through eliminating HTTs entirely. Unless a particular Club can offer a compelling and verifiable justification for its hold over the territory that would
withstand rule of reason scrutiny, the MLB could be precluded from continuing
any territorial telecasting restrictions. Removing this restraint, for example,
would allow telecasters other than previously prescribed RSNs to compete for
coverage and consumers, while allowing MLB clubs to retain interest in their
home operating territories. Broadcasters would regain an opportunity to obtain
the rights to game broadcasts notwithstanding the territorial lines drawn by the
MLB. Importantly, those individuals, business operators, advertisers, and other
consumers who invest in broadcasting with the expectation of access to games
would not be left wondering why the anticipated festivities have been replaced
with a black screen.

172
173

Id.
Id. at 492.

